His sons, Hassan and Hussein, were denied what they thought was their legitimate right of accession to the caliphate. Hassan is believed to have been poisoned in by Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Sunni Umayyad dynasty, while Hussein was killed on the battlefield by the Umayyads in These events gave rise to the Shia concept of martyrdom and the rituals of grieving. The Ithna Asharis are the largest group and believe that Muhammad's religious leadership, spiritual authority and divine guidance were passed on to 12 of his descendants, beginning with Ali, Hassan and Hussein.
The 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, is said to have disappeared from a cave below a mosque in Ithna Asharis believe the so-called "awaited imam" did not die and will return at the end of time to restore justice on earth. In countries which have been governed by Sunnis, Shia tend to make up the poorest sections of society. They often see themselves as victims of discrimination and oppression. Sunni extremists frequently denounce Shia as heretics who should be killed.
The Iranian revolution of launched a radical Shia Islamist agenda that was perceived as a challenge to conservative Sunni regimes, particularly in the Gulf. In , Iran, a Shiite country whose language and culture are Farsi Persian , was invaded by Iraq, an Arab country with a Sunni leadership but a Shiite majority in the population. Despite Iranian appeals, most Iraqi Shiites remained loyal to Iraq, performing military service when required during the Iran-Iraq war.
Both Sunni and Shiite Islam are organized in ways that reflect their beliefs. In view of the emphasis of mainstream Shiism on the role of the Imamate, it is not surprising that the Shiites have a more elaborate religious hierarchy than Sunni Muslims. With the exception of post-revolutionary Iran, the Shiite clergy has been more independent of the government than religious officials have been in Sunni Muslim countries.
Shiite religious officials have had less need to rely on secular governments for money to finance their activities, since they control substantial religious endowments.
In the Shiite communities, the most important appointments to senior religious positions are made by Shiite religious officials, not by the state. In Sunni countries, in contrast, it is typical for governments to exercise control over the appointment of senior religious officials. These governments have also assumed the right to allocate large religious endowments through government ministries created for that purpose. This makes high-ranking Sunni clergy more dependent on the government than their Shiite counterparts.
Sunnis are also more open than Shiites to the idea that the leading of prayers and preaching can be done by lay persons without formal clerical training. In view of the power of the Shiite clergy, it is not surprising that they play an important political role.
Led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the clergy organized the revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran in and turned the country into an Islamic Republic. Shiite clergy have also been prominent in opposition movements in Iraq and Lebanon. Islamic Political Movements Both Shiite and Sunni Muslim political movements have as a primary objective the establishment of Islamic law as the sole basis of government. They reject secularism as an imported western idea, and are opposed to several kinds of social change that use the west as a model, such as changes in the status of women.
Political movements with a religious message have a popular appeal in many Muslim countries. This is partly because of the religious outlook of the people. But it is also because the leaders of these movements are addressing the political issues of the day. One of the reasons for the fall of the Shah of Iran was that his secularizing policies alienated the religious establishment.
In contrast, the monarchs of oil-rich Sunni Muslim countries have made a greater effort to keep their policies in line with religious sensitivities. Another very important reason for the fall of the Shah was the widespread discontent with his development policies favoring rich and westernized groups. The Shah spent a great deal of the country's oil wealth on military and civilian projects thought by many to be poorly conceived.
Iran was a more populous country than other oil-rich Middle Eastern states, so its oil wealth spread less widely among the people. The effect of the Shah's westernizing development policies was to produce a new bourgeois class that was a target of hatred and resentment for poor people.
In addition, like nationalist and leftist Iranian parties, the clergy vehemently attacked the Shah's ties to the West. In spite of their religious orientation, many of the issues addressed by the Islamic movements are the same political or social issues that concern secular politicians.
The movements attack government corruption and the gulf between rich and poor. In Iraq and Lebanon, where Shiite communities are poorer than the Sunni and Christian communities, resentment at perceived discrimination has also allowed Shiite movements to mobilize grassroots support. Problems of corruption and poverty are also invoked by Sunni movements in countries such as Egypt and Algeria, though these movements have so far not been able to obtain support from high-level religious leaders of a stature comparable to the Ayatollah Khomeini before the Iranian revolution.
The opposition to the West is derived from historic resentment in many parts of the Muslim world at western colonialism earlier this century. In addition to problems arising from that period, a number of more recent American and western policies are often cited by Muslim movements: western attempts to incorporate Muslim countries in alliances against the Soviet Union during the Cold War; political interventions such as the CIA-backed coup d'etat of that restored the Shah after a nationalist government led by Mohammed Mossadegh had taken power in Iran; western military and political support for Israel against the Arab world; and western military and political support for unrepresentative governments.
Some of the most dramatic anti-western acts have been carried out by Shiite political groups in Lebanon, where the central government collapsed following the outbreak of civil war in The fighting led to foreign intervention by Syrian, Israeli, and American forces. Radical Shiite movements such as the Hizballah "Party of God" flourished in the period following the dramatic western military intervention in Lebanon in , when Israeli troops expelled the PLO from Beirut, and American peace-keeping forces were sent to Lebanon to be withdrawn in Militant Shiites taking advantage of the lack of a central authority in the country attacked western and Israeli targets, and took hostages, some of whom were killed.
Sunni opposition movements in Egypt and Algeria have also recently been increasingly violent in their anti-government, anti-western tactics. These tactics have caused a major debate in the Islamic world. There is no justification in Islamic scriptures and jurisprudence for indiscriminate killings or assassinations of local or foreign citizens by either Sunni or Shiite Muslims. Consider Rwanda: Before colonialism, the line between Hutu and Tutsi was mostly a class distinction, and often a blurry one 1.
But about a century ago, Belgian colonists hardened the distinction, pushing the idea that Hutus and Tutsis were completely distinct ethnic groups and entrenching Tutsis as dominant over Hutus.
As such, after colonialism, political grievances fell along this ethnic line. Even though the ethnic distinction was arguably in part a modern colonial invention, Rwandans began to treat it as real, which helped lead to one of the worst genocides in modern history. There's debate over whether, or the degree to which, Hutus and Tutsis are ethnically distinct.
Some studies suggest they are; others suggest they're in fact pretty genetically similar. Suffice to say the genetics are complicated, but that Hutu and Tutsi views of their own differences have changed over time, which goes to show how malleable ethnic identities can be, and the degree to which supposedly ancient and unbridgeable divides are in fact modern inventions.
Consider also the city of Baghdad. For much of its history, Sunni and Shia lived generally peacefully, side by side in mixed neighborhoods. But when the US toppled Saddam and disbanded the Iraqi army, it opened a dangerous security vacuum.
Lawlessness and street justice prevailed. Communities that happened to be Sunni or Shia formed self-defense militias, first to protect themselves, then to exact revenge killings.
Sunni families and Shia families came to see one another as threats, and the militias committed massacres to drive out the other side. In just two years, Baghdad's once-mixed neighborhoods were starkly divided by religion.
The story of Baghdad is important not because it's necessary to blame America for everything but because this was in some ways the start of today's Sunni-Shia region-wide war, and it shows how that conflict is not really primarily about religion.
Rather, it is a story of how insecurity and fear can lead a once-unified people to divide themselves along some tribal line, which then hardens into hatred and violence.
And it shows how people will split along whichever lines are most readily available, or whichever lines happen to line up with the politics of the moment. In that case, it was religion. But there's little to this story that is in itself religious, much less ancient. Our mission has never been more vital than it is in this moment: to empower through understanding. Financial contributions from our readers are a critical part of supporting our resource-intensive work and help us keep our journalism free for all.
Please consider making a contribution to Vox today to help us keep our work free for all. Cookie banner We use cookies and other tracking technologies to improve your browsing experience on our site, show personalized content and targeted ads, analyze site traffic, and understand where our audiences come from. By choosing I Accept , you consent to our use of cookies and other tracking technologies. The real roots of Sunni-Shia conflict: beyond the myth of "ancient religious hatreds".
Share this story Share this on Facebook Share this on Twitter Share All sharing options Share All sharing options for: The real roots of Sunni-Shia conflict: beyond the myth of "ancient religious hatreds". Reddit Pocket Flipboard Email. Iraqi Sunni and Shia attend a Baghdad conference bringing together local political and religious leaders.
Al Jazeera's Mehdi Hasan put together a very nice video debunking the myth that Sunni-Shia sectarianism is all about ancient religious hatreds and explaining how modern-day power politics, beginning in , is actually driving much of the sectarianism we're seeing right now: RealityCheck : The myth of a Sunni-Shia war.
If the Sunni-Shia conflict isn't about religion, where did it come from? This development demanded more codified forms of religious and political leadership. Sunni Muslims trusted the secular leadership of the caliphs during the Ummayad based in Damascus from A. Their theological foundations came from the four religious schools of Islamic jurisprudence that emerged over the seventh and eighth centuries. To this day, these schools help Sunni Muslims decide on issues such as worship, criminal law, gender and family, banking and finance, and even bioethical and environmental concerns.
Today, Sunnis comprise about percent of the global Muslim population. In the absence of the leadership of direct descendants, Shias appoint representatives to rule in their place often called ayatollahs. Shias are a minority of the global Muslim population, although they have strong communities in Iraq, Pakistan, Albania, Yemen, Lebanon and Iran. There are also different sects within Shia Islam.
Other disputes that continue to exacerbate the divide include issues of theology, practice and geopolitics. Hadith are the reports of the words and deeds of the prophet and considered an authoritative source of revelation, second only to the Quran.
0コメント